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Abstract  
A Phillips Curve (PC) framework is utilized to study the challenging post-1985 
disinflation process in Israel. The estimated PC is stable and has forecasting power.  
Based on endogenous structural break tests we find that actual and expected 
inflation are co-breaking. We argue that the step-like development of inflation is in 
line with shocks and monetary policy that changed inflationary expectations. The 
disinflation process was long, and a long-term commitment by both the Central 
Bank and the government was required. Credibility was achieved gradually and 
the transition from the last step of 10% to 2% inflation was accomplished by 
introducing an inflation targeting regime. 
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1. Introduction 
The forward-looking Phillips Curve (henceforth PC) is one of the most important 
components of New-Keynesian macroeconomic theory. The seminal contributions 
of Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967) added expected inflation to the Phillips curve 
version of Samuelson and Solow (1960). The theoretical developments that followed 
provided a micro foundation for the forward-looking PC (see e.g., Clarida et al., 
1999 and Woodford, 2003). Today, the PC is considered a principal economic 
relationship in monetary policy practice.1 
In the academic literature there has been an ongoing debate about the empirical 
validity of the PC (see e.g., Gali et al., 1999, Lindé, 2005, Rudd and Whelan, 2005, 
and Gali et al., 2005). More recently, the stability and forecasting performance of the 
Phillips curve are at the center of the discussion. For instance, Ball and Mazumder 
(2011) argue that there is a conundrum because post-crisis U.S. inflation did not fall 
as much as predicted by a PC estimated over 1960-2007. Stock (2011) finds, however, 
that accounting for moderate time variation in the PC equation can resolve this 
puzzle. Gordon (2013) challenges the view of some skeptical economists that “The 
Phillips Curve is widely viewed as dead, destined to the mortuary scrapyard of discarded 
economic ideas”, showing that the PC properly explains the U.S. inflation rate and 
thus “is alive and well”. When Ball and Mazumder (2014) assume perfectly anchored 
inflation expectations, they are able to produce a stable PC relationship for the U.S., 
resolving the puzzle. Mavroeidis et al. (2014) discuss numerous econometric issues 
related to the identification and the estimation of the PC. A major conclusion of their 
survey is that “new datasets are needed to reach an empirical consensus”. 
This paper studies the disinflation process of Israel and provides new evidence for 
a stable and reasonably well forecasting forward-looking PC. The estimation is 
based on financial market data for inflation expectations and different measures of 
                                                          
1 See Gordon (2011) for a survey of the Phillips curve’s history, which certainly has been controversial. 
The PC became a principal economic relationship in monetary policy practice in the US in the 1970s. 
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real economic activity focusing on the period of disinflation after the 1985 
stabilization program.2 Our empirical strategy, adjusted to the case of Israel, 
involves two stages. First, we estimate a PC by least squares and instrumental 
variables, showing that the relation is stable. We find that over a set of alternative 
specifications the coefficient for inflation expectations always has the right sign, is 
highly significant and takes on a value very close to unity. This is in line with 
economic theory. Similarly, the coefficient of real economic activity always has the 
right sign, and is significant in the majority of cases. The estimated PC proves useful 
for forecasting inflation. We do not encounter a puzzle of a missing fall or rise in 
inflation. Second, we use a number of endogenous structural break tests (see Perron, 
2006) in a univariate analysis of inflation and inflation expectations to show that the 
series are actually co-breaking. The inflation steps discussed in Liviatan and 
Melnick (1999) are also found in expected inflation. The timing of the breaks and the 
formation of the steps, from the 1985 stabilization on, are related to the conduct of 
monetary policy, distinct exogenous shocks and the introduction of inflation 
targeting.  
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses preliminary econometric 
issues. In Section 3 we estimate the PC in Israel for the period of 1986-2013. We test 
for the stability of the estimated function and evaluate its forecasting performance 
out of the estimation sample in 2014-2015. The dynamics of expected and actual 
inflation are explored in Section 4, where we perform multiple break point tests 
separately to actual and expected inflation. In Section 5 we connect the econometric 
results with Israeli economic developments and policy.  Conclusions and policy 
implications are discussed in Section 6. 
 
 
                                                          
2 During the year that preceded the stabilization program the rate of inflation was above 400%. The 
stabilization program is briefly described in Appendix 2. See also Bruno (1993), Bruno and Piterman 
(1988) and Liviatan and Melnick (1999). 
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2. Preliminary Econometric Issues 
Mavroeidis et al. (2014) derive the PC from micro foundation principles. This 
exercise leads to the basic equation:3 
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1) +  𝛾𝛾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡  +  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 .  (1) 
 
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 is the rate of inflation in period t, 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1) is expected future inflation, 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡   is a real 
variable proportional to the output gap in period t,  𝛽𝛽 and 𝛾𝛾 are parameters and  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 
is a stochastic shock.  Equation (1) represents the relation to be estimated in the next 
section. 
Mavroeidis et al. (2014) discuss the challenge of dealing with unobserved expected 
inflation 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1). They consider three options; replacing expectations by 
realizations, deriving expectations from a VAR model, or using surveys of 
expectations. All options require the use of instruments to tackle the simultaneity. 
An additional contribution of our study is the use of a fourth alternative to deal with 
unobserved expected inflation.  We propose to use inflationary expectations derived 
from financial markets. It is known from the literature that those estimates may not 
be a pure measure of expectations due to a risk premium and liquidity issues, (see 
e.g., Pflueger and Viceira, 2011). Melnick (2016) estimates an inflation risk bias of 21 
basis points for Israel.  In the empirical specification of equation (1), we include a 
constant term which should pick up this risk bias. The possible endogeneity of 
expected inflation is econometrically dealt by instrumental variable estimation, 
using lagged actual inflation as instruments. 
Milton Friedman commented, in a letter he sent to Michael Bruno4 after the 1985 
stabilization program, on the use of the difference between two bonds issued by the 
government; one, nominal, and the other a purchasing power bond fully adjusted 
                                                          
3 Equation (8) in their paper. 
4 Governor of the Bank of Israel after the 1985 stabilization program. 
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to inflation5 "… that difference could serve as an alternative nominal anchor to the system. 
As for myself, for the U.S. it is the first nominal anchor that has been suggested that seems 
to me to have advantages over the nominal money supply."6  Being a strong believer of 
the efficiency of competitive markets, it seems that Friedman supported the use of 
market derived expected inflation as superior to other methods of evaluating 
expected inflation.  
To account for possible endogeneity of the output gap 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, we use two alternative 
measures of 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡: lagged unemployment and lagged deviation of the log of GDP from 
an HP filter.  
 
3. Empirical Assessment of the Israeli Phillips Curve  
3.1 Data on Inflation and Inflation Expectations 
Figure 1 displays actual and expected inflation7 from 1986Q1 to 2013Q4. The rate of 
inflation is the quarter-on-quarter percentage change in CPI, expressed in annual 
rates. Expected inflation has an expectations horizon of one year and is measured 
by the difference in returns to unindexed government bonds and fully CPI-indexed 
bonds. Clearly, the rate of inflation fluctuates around a less volatile rate of expected 
inflation.  By casual observation, it seems that expected and actual inflation evolve 
in steps until the mid-1990s. Figure 1 also suggests that there is a transition period 
between 1996 and 2001 when both time series begin a gradual decline finally 
reaching a long period of relative price stability.8 
                                                          
5 Yariv (1986) developed some proxies on that line and they were used after the stabilization of 1985. 
6 This was written before the TIPS were issued in the U.S. 
7 For a detailed description of the data see Appendix 1. 
8 2% is the center of the inflation target range in Israel, which was introduced in 2003. 
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Figure 1. Actual and Expected Inflation
1986Q1 - 2013Q4
(percent change at annual rates)
 
 
 
3.2 Estimated Phillips Curve 
Table 1 presents eight versions of the estimated PC. Four of them are estimated by 
OLS and four by TSLS using lagged inflation as an instrument for expected inflation.  
In equations 1-4, we use the fourth lag of the deviation of log GDP from an HP 
filtered trend, YGAP. In equations 5-8, we use lagged unemployment, U, as a 
measure of the output gap. All equations include a seasonal dummy for the second 
quarter. Equations 3, 4, 7 and 8 include dummies for outliers at the last quarter of 
1998 and the second quarter of 2002, which experienced large price changes due to 
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exceptionally large exchange rate shocks.9 Standard errors are estimated with the 
HAC Newey-West correction for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
 
Table 1. Phillips Curve Estimation* 
1986Q1 – 2013Q4 
(p values in parenthesis) 
 (1) (2)1 (3)2 (4)1,2 (5) (6)1 (7)2 (8)1,2 
 OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS 
C -0.72 -0.95 -0.92 -1.20 1.80 1.58 2.26 2.01 
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.06) (0.02) (0.25) (0.33) (0.14) (0.18) 
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑒𝑒3 0.96 1.00 0.97 1.01 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.99 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
U(-1)     -0.29 -0.28 -0.36 -0.35 
     (0.14) (0.15) (0.04) (0.05) 
YGAP(-4) 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.56     
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)     
R2 0.71 0.71 0.75 0.75 0.71 0.71 0.75 0.75 
DW 1.71 1.70 1.60 1.59 0.72 1.72 1.69 1.69 
* We estimated the equation 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐 +  𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1) +  𝛾𝛾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡  +  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡. P-values in parentheses are based on HAC standard 
errors with Newey-West correction for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  All equations include a seasonal 
dummy for the second quarter. 
1 Lagged inflation is the instrument for expected inflation.  
2 Including dummies for 98.4 and 2002.2 quarters of large exchange rate shock on prices. 
3 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑒𝑒  is the one year horizon breakeven inflation. 
 
 
In all equations we cannot reject the null hypothesis that β (the coefficient of 
expected inflation) is equal to 0.99. Given quarterly data, 0.99 is the standard value 
assigned to this parameter in theoretical models (see e.g., Clarida et al., 2000).  The 
                                                          
9 Cukierman and Melnick (2015) showed that the pass-through from the exchange rate to prices is 
virtually 1 for that period.  
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β estimated by TSLS is always larger than the one estimated by OLS, indicating a 
correction of the simultaneity bias.  The impact of the output gap, as measured by 
the deviation of log GDP from the HP filter, is highly significant and stable across 
the different specifications. When using the rate of unemployment as a proxy for 
real activity, we obtain the economically plausible negative sign. However, 
unemployment is found to be significantly different from zero only in the equations 
that include the price shocks dummies10. 
 
3.3 Stability of the Phillips Curve 
We apply a number of tests to investigate the stability of the estimated PC. The tests 
refer to our baseline specification with OLS estimation and the output gap. 
Beginning with an intuitive procedure, Figure 2 shows recursively estimated 
residuals. Notice that the estimated residuals lie well within the band of two 
standard errors and do not exhibit outliers, perhaps caused by parameter changes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 We estimated the PC for the period 2001Q2-20013Q4 to check whether the PC has become flatter, 
for the Israeli case this was rejected.  
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Figure 2: Recursively Estimated Residuals 
 
 
Figure 3 shows that the recursively estimated slope parameters for both expected 
inflation and the output gap stabilize fairly quickly around the values obtained from 
the estimation over the full sample (black horizontal lines).11   
Figure 3: Recursively Estimated Parameters 
 
                                                          
11 The stability also applies to the constant term. 
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Formal break point tests confirm these results. Neither the Qandt-Andrews test for 
a single endogenous break nor the multiple break point test of Bai and Perron (1998) 
finds evidence for unstable parameters. The test statistics for those tests are 2.13 
[QA] and 2.13, 2.38 [BP], respectively, and are all far below the critical values for 
rejection of stability. 
 3.3 Forecasting Ability 
We also evaluate the PC's ability to forecast inflation out of the estimation sample 
from 2014Q1 to 2015Q4. The forecast is performed using equation 1 in Table 1 and 
is displayed in Figure 4.  Except for the strong negative decline in the CPI in the first 
quarter of 2015, mainly due to the sharp decline in oil prices, the forecast seems to 
do a reasonable job, notwithstanding the difficulty in forecasting inflation. The root-
mean-square error (RMSE) of the PC forecast is 1.89, while that of an autoregressive 
forecast, which might be considered a natural benchmark, is 2.34. In any case, the 
rate of actual inflation lies within the 2 standard errors band of the PC forecast, 
including the first quarter of 2015.  We do not find a “missing inflation” phenomena 
as encountered for the U.S. in Ball and Mazumder (2011). 
-6
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Figure 4. Inflation and Inflation Phillips Curve Forecast
2014.1 - 2015.4
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From Figure 1 and the estimated PC equations, which document basically a one-to-
one relation of expected and actual inflation, we conclude that the expected 
disinflation in the post-stabilization era of Israel is in line with the actual disinflation.  
 
4. Expected and Actual Inflation after Israel's 1985 Stabilization Program  
In this section we characterize the time series properties of expected and actual 
inflation in the post-stabilization era. According to the forward-looking PC, 
inflation dynamics are driven by inflation expectations. And, according to the 
disinflation-in-steps hypothesis of Melnick and Liviatan (1999), the stabilization 
program was followed by a stepwise declining inflation rate. The PC relation 
hence implies that expected inflation must have developed in steps too, causing a 
similar stepwise decline of actual inflation.  
We therefore test the disinflation-in-steps hypothesis by testing for multiple 
endogenous structural breaks in the following, purely statistical, model 
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 ,   𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑙𝑙 + 1 .  (2) 
The tests we use were developed in Bai (1997), Bai and Perron (1998), Bai and 
Perron (2003a) and Bai and Perron (2003b) (see Appendix 3 for further details). In 
equation (2), 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 may stand for expected inflation 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒  or actual inflation 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡. We use 
quarterly observations from 1986Q1 through 2013Q4. The error term 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 may be 
autocorrelated and heteroskedastic.  The level parameter 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  is allowed to break 
up to 𝑙𝑙 times which gives us 𝑙𝑙 + 1 steps.  
The break tests reveal several interesting results. First, both expected and actual 
inflation break two times. Second, the series are virtually co-breaking. The breaks 
in inflation expectations occur at 1992Q1 and 1998Q2, while for actual inflation the 
11 
 
tests find breaks at 1991Q4 and 1999Q1.12  
A properly defined step should be a constant average inflation without a trend. 
However, as mentioned earlier, data in Figure 1 suggest that there may have been 
a more gradual transition from one step to the next, particularly in the late 1990s. 
To further explore the nature of the breaks, we perform tests in a more general 
model that allows for potentially different time trends in each sub-period. 
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑇 +  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 ,   𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑙𝑙 + 1 . (3) 
In equation (3), T is a deterministic time trend that may have a different slope 
parameter δi in each regime. 
The multiple break tests yield the following estimated equation (3) for expected 
inflation.13 
Regime 1, 1986Q1 – 1991Q4  𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒  = 17.1 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡�    
                                                                                            (9.9)  
 
Regime 2, 1992Q1 – 1995Q4  𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒  = 11.8 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡�   
                                                                                            (4.6)   
Regime 3, 1996Q1 – 2001Q2  𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒  = 32.9 − 0.5 ∗ 𝑇𝑇 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡�   
                                                                                           (25.6)    (-22.7) 
 
Regime 4, 2001Q3 – 2103Q4  𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒  = 2.0 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡�   
                                                                                           (2.6) 
 
The R2 of this regression is 0.92 and t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
In the more general model, the breaks test reveal an additional regime. We now 
have 3 disinflation steps including a gradual transition period. The first step 
formed after the 1985 stabilization program from 1986Q1 to 1991Q4. The second 
step formed after the large immigration wave to Israel from the former Soviet 
Union from 1992Q1 to 1995Q4. There is a transition period with a trend decline in 
the rate of inflation starting with the implementation of an inflation targeting 
monetary policy from 1996Q1 – 2001Q2. The third step is the current price stability 
                                                          
12 See Table A3.1 in appendix 3. 
13 We omit statistically insignificant sub-period trends. In regimes 1, 2 and 4 the constant can be 
interpreted as the average expected inflation. 
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step beginning in 2001Q3 and continuing through 2013Q4. In the next section we 
relate our econometric results with Israeli economic developments and policy. 
 
5. Expected and Actual Inflation Steps and Transition to Price Stability 
5.1 The Formation of the First Step 1986Q1 – 1991Q4 
Israel’s stabilization program of 1985 was clearly successful in achieving its main 
objective of strongly reducing inflation. While the inflation rate from January to July 
1985 was close to 400%, by 1986 it was already less than 20%. However, while a 
deterioration to full-fledged hyperinflation was prevented, the program did not 
fully eliminate high inflation levels when judged by Western standards. The 
stabilization program corrected the fundamental fiscal and balance of payments 
imbalances, and provided the Central Bank a basic law to carry out independent 
monetary policy. Nevertheless, expected inflation remained stuck at about 20% for 
an extended period from 1986Q1 until 1991Q4.14 What is a plausible explanation of 
this phenomenon? 
To begin with, the stabilization program had to deal with the crucial absence of 
credibility. The non-orthodox components of the program were similar to measures 
taken before the program’s initiation, when a series of “package deals”15 failed to 
solve the problem. To further complicate matters, the fundamental correction of the 
fiscal and balance of payments deficits was not well understood and was received 
with skepticism.16 
                                                          
14 A large portion of inflation vanished, as described in Sargent (1982) but a hard core residual 20% 
inflation remained. 
15 The package deals were tripartite price-wage agreements between the government, the Histadrut 
(The National Trade Union), and the employers' organization. These deals were signed typically after 
a price shock due to subsidy cuts and a devaluation of the currency to deal with the fiscal deficit and 
the balance of payments crises. 
16 Support for this view is the critical approach to the stabilization program of leading professors of 
economics at Tel Aviv University. 
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However, despite beginning with difficult credibility conditions, the program 
succeeded in reducing inflation from levels of several hundred percent to about 20% 
in 1986. The large decrease of inflation was achieved at relatively low costs in terms 
of output loss and unemployment, so there was enormous political gain. The initial 
success of the program was met with an increase in acceptance and improved 
credibility. 
After the program’s initiation, the dominant policy goal was to stabilize expected 
inflation and thus inflation, and prevent its acceleration or a return to pre-
stabilization dynamics. There were three main policy challenges. The first challenge 
was to avoid a rise in real wages. The nominal wage compensation agreement that 
was part of the program that became operational at the beginning of 1986,17 was 
larger than what was necessary to restore the pre-stabilization real wage level. This 
fact is an indication that inflation declined more than expected. A rise in real wages 
was avoided by further agreements with the Histadrut and the employers’ 
organization. 
The second challenge was a declining real exchange rate (in a fixed exchange rate 
regime) caused by a continuing inflationary trend. This was initially dealt with by 
incremental devaluations followed by the establishment of an exchange rate band 
that allowed for a trend rise in the nominal exchange rate (see Figure 5).  It is clear 
that fixing the nominal exchange rate was not strong enough to anchor the price 
level18 or to fully eliminate inflation. Figure 5 shows that a devaluation was 
implemented in the first quarter of 1987, thus signaling that the government and the 
Bank of Israel were accommodating the residual inflation of 1986 in an attempt to 
guide inflationary expectations to the 20% initial step. This signal was further 
                                                          
17 This compensation was arranged as part of the stabilization program to compensate workers for 
their agreement to give up the initial cost of living allowance, because of the price shock of the first 
month of the program.  
18 In particular for the prices of non-tradable goods. 
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strengthened by introducing a moving horizontal exchange rate band and then 
developing a diagonal exchange rate band.   
The third challenge was related to the elimination of price controls. The solution 
was to implement a gradual elimination of controls, allowing prices to rise at the 
inflation step level without re-introducing subsidization but accommodating the 
expected inflation step. All this helped to establish the first expected and actual 
inflation step of 20%. After stabilizing the 20% inflation step, the fiscal and balance 
of payments situation became more widely known and better understood, so the 
program gained credibility validating the new level of actual and expected 
inflation. 
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Figure 5. Exchange Rate and Exchange Rate Band
1986Q1 - 2013Q4
 
It is fair to say that the government and the Central Bank did not try to further 
decrease inflation. Their main goal was to exploit the initial disinflationary success 
by stabilizing the rate of inflation at 20%. The focus was on avoiding a higher or 
accelerating level of inflation that might be caused by an adverse shock. As Liviatan 
15 
 
and Melnick (1999) proposed, ”this can be understood in view of the lack of consensus 
about the cost-benefits-balance of further reducing inflation from its relatively low level”. It 
seems that the Central Bank adopted an asymmetric policy rule of the type 
presented in Orphanides and Wilcox (2002), reacting strongly to a possible upward 
deviation from the inflation step, while taking advantage of favorable shocks by 
setting accordingly the rate of interest, supporting the temporary inflation step, and 
subsequently the inflation target. 
 
5.2 The Formation of the Second Step 1992Q1 - 1995Q4 
The transition to the second step of 10% was not the result of a new anti-
inflationary policy. Rather, it occurred as the result of a large supply shock caused 
by the massive wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union that started in 
1990. Israel absorbed 1 million immigrants, half of them between 1990 and 1992. 
The break date of 1991Q4 from the statistical analysis is therefore perfectly in line 
with this extraordinary event.19 This transition to a lower inflation step seems like 
an application of the disinflation strategy described by Blinder (1994): ”Proponents 
of this approach hold that when inflation is moderate but still above the long-run objective, 
the Fed should not take deliberate anti-inflation action, but rather should wait for external 
circumstances such as favorable supply shocks and unforeseen recessions to deliver the 
desired reduction in inflation. While waiting for such circumstances to arise, the Fed 
should aggressively resist incipient increases in inflation.” 
Despite accelerated economic growth and the creation of many new jobs, 
unemployment increased because the size of the labor force grew at a faster rate. 
                                                          
19 The conditions for disinflation in Israel were favorably affected by a decline in the rate of inflation 
in Israel’s principal trading partners’ countries. 
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This circumstance put downward pressure on wages (see Table 2). Although the 
decline in real wages supported a decline in the rate of expected inflation, the 
massive increase in the labor force had a more substantial impact on the flexibility 
of the labor market. Another significant impact on the labor market was the 
reluctance of the immigrants from the former Soviet Union to join the labor union 
in Israel. This effectively reduced the power of the mighty Histadrut, resulting in a 
major labor market reform. 
 
Table 2. Transition to the Second Step1 
 
 GDP Inflation Unemployment Real Wages Immigration 
1989 1.4 20.7 8.9 100 0.5 
1990 6.6 17.6 9.6 99.1 4.4 
1991 6,1 18.0 10.6 95.9 3.8 
1992 7.2 9.4 11.2 97.1 1.6 
1 The data refer to GDP growth, Inflation as the percent change of the CPI during the year, unemployment in percent, real 
wage index with 1989=100 and immigration in percent of the population 
 
During this time, monetary policy was opportunistic, as defined in Orphanides and 
Wilcox (2002). On the fiscal front, the passage of the balanced budget law allowed 
a temporary increase in the fiscal deficit needed to absorb the new immigrants 
without impairing government credibility. On the balance of payments front, the 
U.S. granted loan guarantees to finance an anticipated rise in the current account 
deficit associated with the absorption of the new immigrants. 
In 1993 the first inflation target was announced (see Figure 6). It was not a transition 
to a proper inflation targeting regime, but rather an attempt to stabilize the new 
lower inflation step generated by the immigration shock. Moreover, the target for 
the rate of inflation needed to be coordinated with the slope of the diagonal 
exchange rate band at a rate consistent with the difference between domestic and 
foreign inflation (see Ben-Bassat, 1995). 
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The first move toward an inflation targeting regime was implemented in 1995. In 
Figure 7, we present the policy interest rate set by the Bank of Israel.  The rise of 
the interest rate during 1994 was only an adjustment to the level of expected 
inflation, so no rise in the real expected interest rate is observed. In the first quarter 
of 1995, however, for the first time since the stabilization program, we see that the 
additional rise in the interest rate results in a rise in the real expected rate signaling 
that the Bank of Israel was actively applying a disinflation policy.   
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This active disinflation policy led, with a few quarters lag, to a gradual decline in 
expected inflation. 
5.2 Transition - From Second Step to Price stability 1996Q1 – 2001Q2 
From 1996Q1 we estimate a decline trend in expected inflation. Although inflation 
targeting had an impact on inflationary expectations, conflict with the diagonal 
exchange rate band lessened its effectiveness (see Sokoler, 2000).  In 1997, the 
interest rate differential between domestic and foreign rates produced large foreign 
exchange capital inflow. The exchange rate hit the lower limit of the exchange rate 
band forcing the Bank of Israel to defend the band and buy foreign exchange while 
sterilizing the purchases (see Figure 5). Hence, the ability of the Bank to pursue the 
necessary restrictive policy to reduce both expected inflation and real inflation was 
limited. From the 1997 episode it became clear that the exchange rate band was 
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incompatible with traditional disinflation monetary policy.  Setting the required 
higher interest rates contradicted the lower exchange rate limit. In order to apply 
the required monetary policy necessary for further disinflation, it was essential to 
abandon the exchange rate band.20 
The transition to the step of low inflation can be attributed to the monetary policy 
implemented to achieve price stability under an inflation targeting regime. This 
was possible after eliminating the conflict between inflation targeting and the 
exchange rate band. First by widening the band, and then by eliminating it all 
together and moving to a free floating regime (see Figure 5). 
Monetary policy gained credibility through two distinct episodes. Both episodes 
are clear illustrations of an asymmetric policy design, and change in focus towards 
price stability. The first episode was the Bank of Israel’s reaction to the LTCM21 
crisis of 1998 and the related Russian and South East Asian financial crises. The 
contagion effect of those crises had a strong impact on Israeli financial markets.  
The main effect was that large capital outflows produced a sharp devaluation 
creating a price shock because most domestic prices were indexed to the US dollar, 
a pathological inheritance of Israel’s history of inflation (see Shiffer, 2001). 
In the past, a rise in inflation was usually associated with exchange rate shocks 
combined with a balance of payments crisis (see Liviatan and Piterman, 1986). At 
that time, however, Israel was not in a balance of payments crisis. For the first time 
the Bank of Israel was able to deal with the price shock crisis by a sharply increasing 
the interest rate by 400 basis points (see Figure 8). This monetary policy shock had 
an immediate impact on the movement of capital. The previous outflows reversed, 
                                                          
20 It seems that abandoning the exchange rate anchor was delayed due to lack of experience with 
traditional monetary policy in Israel. 
21 Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) was an American hedge fund management firm.  The 
firm’s most important hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Portfolio L.P., collapsed in the late 1990s. 
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and the exchange rate returned to pre-crisis levels. To a large extent, this resolved 
the impact of the previous price shock. Although the exchange rate changed its 
course and inflation did not accelerate, the Bank of Israel persisted with its policy 
of a high interest rate for a considerable time. Even though the rate of inflation was 
very low (in fact, the rate of inflation during 2000 was zero), the interest rate did 
not returned to the pre-LTCM crisis level until 2000. It seems that this determined 
action by the Bank of Israel had a positive credibility effect on inflation 
expectations, convincing the public of the Bank’s intentions to eliminate the 
residual inflation and achieve price stability. 
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5.2 The Present Step – Price Stability 2001Q3 – 2013Q4 
The beginning of Israel’s efforts to preserve price stability marks the second 
episode that resulted in improved credibility, and allowed expected and actual 
inflation to settle down at the price stability inflation target.22 Although the episode 
was not fueled by external crises (as the LTCM), it had a similar effect on inflation 
expectations, reflecting the commitment of the Bank of Israel to achieve price 
stability. In December of 2001, in the context of a policy deal with the government, 
the Bank of Israel reduced its interest rate by 200 basis points to 3.8%. This was a 
big surprise to the markets and produced large capital outflows causing a 
depreciation of the currency, and a corresponding price shock similar to the shock 
of 1998. Again, there was concern that inflation would accelerate, wasting the 
previous disinflation achievements. The Bank took aggressive corrective action by 
raising the interest rate to 9.1%, reversing the outflow of capital and minimizing 
the potential exchange rate price shock (see Figure 9).  
                                                          
22 The price stability target was set at 1% to 3%. 
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The Bank of Israel maintained the high interest rate even though the economy was 
suffering from a serious recession. It seems that this episode finally convinced the 
public of the Central Bank’s commitment to maintain price stability. By 2003 
expected inflation stabilized around the center of the inflation target rate at 2%. 
Israel finally achieved price stability bringing to a conclusion the efforts aimed at 
controlling inflation that began with the stabilization program of 1985.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study we utilize the PC framework to study the challenging post-1985 
disinflation stabilization program in Israel. The sample includes the immediate 
disinflation experience and the prolonged transition to price stability that followed. 
Our econometric analysis shows that the estimated PC is stable and it has 
forecasting power. We use expected inflation derived from the financial market 
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and different measures of real economic activity. We find that, over a set of 
alternative specifications and estimation procedures, the coefficient for inflation 
expectations always has the right sign, is highly significant and takes on a value 
very close to unity, being in line with economic theory. Similarly, the coefficient of 
real economic activity always has the right sign, and is significant in the majority 
of cases.  
The behavior of expected and actual inflation is further explored using a number 
of endogenous structural break tests (see Perron, 2006) in a univariate analyses of 
inflation and expected inflation and find that the series are co-breaking. The 
inflation steps discussed in Liviatan and Melnick (1999) are also found in expected 
inflation. 
The statistical results are found to be in line with the historical developments in 
Israel and are related to the conduct of monetary policy, distinct exogenous shocks 
and the introduction of inflation targeting.  
The success of the 1985 stabilization program in Israel clearly illustrates that the 
elimination of inflation was not achieved through a single act. Even when the 
fundamental fiscal and monetary policies were adequate, and other heterodox 
components were used, the disinflation process was long and a long-term 
commitment to disinflation was required. A high degree of perseverance by both 
the government and the Central Bank was needed to finally achieve price stability. 
A key factor in the stabilization process was the government’s determination to 
reduce the public debt and government expenditures, creating a basic economic 
predisposition for disinflation (see Figure 10).23 
                                                          
23 This had also a positive effect on the balance of payments. 
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Credibility was achieved gradually. First, by stabilizing the inflation rate after its 
initial drop following the implementation of the stabilization program. This 
generated the first 20% inflation step. Then, working opportunistically to stabilize 
the rate of inflation at a lower rate following the labor supply shock caused by the 
massive immigration wave. This generated the second 10% inflation step.  
Although we do not have a formal proof, our conjecture is that this part of Israeli 
disinflation supports the conclusion of Aksoy et al. (2006, p. 1879): ”We show that 
the opportunistic wait and see approach to disinflation that relies on favorable exogenous 
circumstances effectively achieves disinflation over time at a lower cost in terms of output 
losses than the conventional approach.” 
Disinflation continued by adopting an inflation targeting regime, and by 
gradually abandoning the exchange rate as the nominal anchor of the system. 
From 1996Q1, after active disinflation monetary policy is applied in the context of 
25 
 
an inflation targeting regime, we observe a gradual reduction of expected 
inflation. Monetary policy was hampered by a conflict between setting an interest 
rate consistent with the inflation target and the location and slope of the exchange 
rate band.  After widening the exchange rate band in 1998, the inflation targeting 
regime gained credibility and expected inflation continued to decline. 
The inflation targeting regime was challenged and put to tests by two strong price 
shocks in 1998Q4 and in 2002Q2. A firm determination shown by the Bank of 
Israel to deal with those shocks became visible. Monetary policy was highly 
restrictive with exceptionally high real interest rates (especially in 2002), even 
when the economy was suffering from a deep recession. This seems to have finally 
persuaded the public that the Bank was determined to achieve price stability 
engendering a strong dampening effect on inflationary expectations.  The process 
was finalized by moving to the third and current price stability step. 
We conclude that the use of a forward looking inflation targeting regime with an 
independent Central Bank that is free to use monetary instruments to stabilize the 
inflation rate was crucial to the elimination of the last 10% inflation step and thus 
to achieve long-run price stability. 
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Appendix 1. The Data 
The rate of inflation is the annualized percentage change between the average 
monthly CPI of the quarter from its previous quarter. 
Beginning in January 1994, the Bank of Israel began to publish a monthly estimate 
of its one year horizon expected inflation.24  Expected inflation is estimated by the 
breakeven between the one year return on a nominal bond issued by the Bank of 
Israel as an instrument of monetary policy (Makam) and the one year horizon return 
on a fully indexed to the CPI bond issue by the government (Galil). 
The Bank of Israel provided us with unpublished estimates of expected inflation 
computed using similar methodology, for the period January 1988 - December 
1993.25 
Expected inflation for January 1986 – December 1987 was constructed in the 
following way: For the period January 1988 – December 1991 we computed the 
breakeven between the Makam,26 and the one year horizon fully linked to the CPI 
Galil.27  Comparing that breakeven estimate with the expected inflation obtained 
from the Bank, we estimated a 300 basis points average difference. This difference 
is attributed to a liquidity premium caused by a treasury imposed limit on the issue 
of Makam by the Bank of Israel.28   We obtained expected inflation for January 1986 
– December 1987 by assuming the same 300 basis points liquidity premium added 
it to the breakeven between the Makam,29 and the one year horizon fully linked, 
                                                          
24 The date is related to the announcement of and inflation target. 
25 We would like to thank David Elkayam from the Bank of Israel, for supplying the expected inflation 
series for that period. 
26 Those were taken from the Annual Reports of the Bank of Israel. 
27 Those were taken from the data bank of the Bank of Israel. 
28 The treasury imposed a ceiling on the amount of Makam that could be issued by the Bank.  The 
ceiling was eliminated in January 2002. 
29 See footnote 26. 
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Galil.30  The quarterly one year horizon expected inflation is the average of the 
monthly expected inflation in the quarter. 
The unemployment series is the quarterly rate of unemployment estimated by the 
labor survey carried out by the CBS. 
The YGAP is the deviation from the quarterly log of GDP published by the CBS. 
All data are available on request.   
                                                          
30 See footnote 27. 
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Appendix 2.  Israel's 1985 Stabilization Program  
The stabilization program in Israel was one of the f irst  heterodox type 
programs developed in the 1980s to deal with inflation not only in Israel, but 
also in Latin America ( cf. Bruno et al., 1988). The orthodox component of the 
program included traditional fiscal and monetary contractionary policies. On 
the fiscal side, the main component was cutting government spending (primarily 
defense spending and subsidies), which reduced the government deficit to a 
sustainable long-run level.31 On the monetary policy side, restraint primary 
credit ceilings were also introduced, resulting in exceptionally high interest rates. 
Crucial legislation banning the government from borrowing from the Central 
Bank was also enacted. The law gave the Central Bank the necessary de facto 
independence to carry out independent monetary policy.32 A symbolic measure of 
the stabilization was to erase 3 zeros from the currency, effectively creating a new 
currency, the New Israeli Shekel.  
It was believed at that time, however, that to stop inflation rapidly and to cut 
the strong dynamic inertial forces, a non-orthodox component had to be included 
in the program. A central ingredient of the program was the introduction of a 
fixed exchange rate vis-a`-vis a basket of currencies after a large devaluation at the 
beginning of the program. The exchange rate was designed to be the nominal 
anchor of the system. When the program began, an exchange rate shock was 
amplified by the elimination of subsidies33 before the imposition of price controls. 
To avoid wage compensation for the initial price shock, a wage agreement was 
reached that temporarily stopped the cost of living allowance and provided for 
                                                          
31 In the pre-stabilization era the fiscal deficit and thus the trend growth in the public debt were 
unsustainable in the long-run, as defined in Drazen and Helpman (1990). 
32 In the pre-stabilization era money financing was freely used by the government. 
33 In the month of July 1985, when the program started, the CPI rose by more than 37%. 
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restoring real wages to the pre-stabilization level only after a lag of 6 month.  
In order to enhance the credibility of the stabilization program, two further 
components involving the US government were added. The first component 
was a one-time grant of $ 1.5 billion which was designated to serve as a cushion 
for a possible deterioration of the balance of payments.34 The second, a change in 
the form of US economic aid to Israel from lending to a grant of $ 3 billion per 
year to finance Israel’s purchase of military equipment.35 Israel was allowed to 
convert a small component of this second grant for domestic uses. Finally, the U.S. 
– Israel Joint Economic Development Group (JEDG), a joint committee of US and 
Israeli government officials and economists, was assigned the task to track the 
progress of the program. 
  
                                                          
34 This was a key component since in the pre-stabilization era the acceleration of inflation was related 
to balance of payments crises, see Bruno and Fischer (1986), Liviatan and Piterman (1986). 
35 The borrowing from the US, before 1985, increased the external debt of Israel and aggravated the 
unsustainable rise in the public debt. 
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Appendix 3: Structural Break Point Tests 
 
The testing theory for multiple endogenous breaks was developed by Bai (1997), 
Bai and Perron (1998), Bai and Perron (2003a), Bai and Perron (2003b). For the sake 
of robustness, we consider several variants of multiple break tests. Each variant 
builds on the sum of squared residuals from a regression model, in our case: 
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = ?̂?𝑐𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡 ,   𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑙𝑙 + 1  (A3.1) 
∑ ∑ (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 − ?̂?𝑐𝑖𝑖)2𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖−1+1𝑙𝑙+1𝑖𝑖=1   (A3.2) 
(𝑇𝑇0 = 0 and 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙+1 = 𝑇𝑇) and is based on the corresponding F-statistic 
𝐹𝐹(𝑇𝑇1, … ,𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙) = 1𝑇𝑇 �𝑇𝑇−(𝑙𝑙+1)𝑙𝑙 � ?̂?𝑐𝑅𝑅′(𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉�(?̂?𝑐)𝑅𝑅′)−1𝑅𝑅?̂?𝑐  (A3.3) 
where 𝑉𝑉(?̂?𝑐) is a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimator of the 
variance of the breaking regression coefficient. The error term 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 is allowed to 
follow a different distribution in each of the 𝑙𝑙 + 1  steps, implying that the 
estimator 𝑉𝑉(?̂?𝑐) varies across the disinflation steps. 𝑅𝑅 is defined such that 𝑅𝑅?̂?𝑐 = (?̂?𝑐1′ −
?̂?𝑐2
′ , … , ?̂?𝑐𝑙𝑙′ − ?̂?𝑐𝑙𝑙+1′ ). Apparently, the F-statistic increases and an additional break date 
becomes more likely, if differences between estimated coefficients of adjacent 
regimes are large. Bai and Perron (2003b) provide simulated critical values for the 
following variants of the tests. 
 
In the first step of the sequential test, the F-statistic is used to test for a single break 
over the full sample. The natural breakpoint candidate is the date when the sum 
of squared residuals is most reduced. Provided that the break is found to be 
significant, the procedure is repeated for both subsamples to identify a possible 
second break date. The sequential testing procedure stops when the null of no 
break cannot be rejected anymore. In the global test, optimization is performed 
along both dimensions, the number of breakpoints and the break dates. Bai and 
Perron (2003a) propose an efficient algorithm to reduce the computational burden 
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of the global test considerably. Finally, we use the combined break test proposed by 
Bai and Perron (1998). In this variant, 𝑙𝑙 is determined globally and sequential tests 
for additional breaks are conducted in each of the 𝑙𝑙 + 1 regimes. 
In our empirical application, we allow for up to 5 structural breaks implying up to 
6 different disinflation steps. Note that this choice covers the case of 3 steps, referring 
to periods of high, medium and low inflation. We trim 7.5% of the observations at 
the boundaries of each disinflation step. 
The multiple break point test results are summarized in Table A3.1. The columns 
include the number of breaks 𝑙𝑙 under the alternative hypothesis, followed by the 
robust test statistic, the relevant critical value and the estimated break dates. 
The tests provide a clear picture of the disinflation steps. The global tests exhibit 
their maximum at 𝑙𝑙 + 2 where they both clearly reject the null of a single break. In 
line with the global tests, the sequential and combined tests also reject the null of 
a single break. Besides, they show that – even at the 10% level – 2 breaks are not 
rejected in favor of 3. All tests consistently find the breaks at 1991Q4 and 1999Q1. 
 
Table A3.1  Inflation Steps in Israel: Results from Endogenous Break: 1986Q1 – 2013Q4 
Expected Inflation 
Multiple 
break test 
variant 
breaks 
(𝒍𝒍) 
under 
𝑯𝑯𝟏𝟏 
test 
statistic 
5% 
crit. 
value 
first 
break 
date 
breaks 
(𝒍𝒍) 
under 
𝑯𝑯𝟏𝟏 
test 
statistic 
5% 
crit. 
value 
second 
break 
date 
breaks 
(𝒍𝒍) 
under 
𝑯𝑯𝟏𝟏 
test 
statistic 
10% 
crit. 
value 
global 
(𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎) 
1 333.17 8.88 1992Q1 2 513.86 8.88 1998Q2 3 361.03 7.46 
global 
(𝑾𝑾𝑼𝑼𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎) 
1 333.17 9.91 1992Q1 2 610.65 9.91 1998Q2 3 519.75 8.20 
Sequential 
 
1 333.17 8.58 1992Q1 2 170.92 10.13 1998Q2 3 2.69 9.41 
Combined 
 
1 333.17 8.58 1992Q1 2 170.92 10.13 1998Q2 3 5.47 9.41 
Actual Inflation 
global 
(𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎) 
1 76.68 8.88 1991Q4 2 106.65 8.88 1999Q1 3 72.50 7.46 
global 
(𝑾𝑾𝑼𝑼𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎) 
1 76.68 9.91 1991Q4 2 126.74 9.91 1999Q1 3 104.37 8.20 
Sequential 
 
1 76.68 8.58 1991Q4 2 29.90 10.13 1999Q1 3 5.09 9.41 
Combined 
 
1 76.68 8.58 1991Q4 2 29.90 10.13 1999Q1 3 2.75 9.41 
 
 
32 
 
References 
Aksoy, Y., Orphanides, A., Small, D., Wieland, V., and Wilcox, D. (2006). A 
quantitative exploration of the opportunistic approach to disinflation. Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 53 (8): pp. 1877 – 1893. 
Bai, J. (1997). Estimating multiple breaks one at a time. Econometric Theory, 13 (3): 
pp. 315–352. 
Bai, J. and Perron, P. (1998). Estimating and testing linear models with multiple 
structural changes. Econometrica, 66 (1): pp. 47–78. 
Bai, J. and Perron, P. (2003a). Computation and analysis of multiple structural 
change models. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 18 (1): pp. 1–22. 
Bai, J. and Perron, P. (2003b). Critical values for multiple structural change tests. The 
Econometrics Journal, 6 (1): pp. 72–78. 
Ball, L., and Mazumder, S. (2011). “Inflation Dynamics and the Great Recession,” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Spring), pp. 337-381. 
Ball, L., and Mazumder, S. (2014). “A Phillips Curve with Anchored Expectations 
and Short-Term Unemployment”, working paper 20715 NBER, Cambridge, MA. 
Ben-Bassat, A. (1995).  The inflation target in Israel: Policy and development.  In 
Targeting Inflation, H. G. Haldane (ed.). Bank of England. 
Blinder, A. S. (1994). ”Prepared Statement” in nominations of Alan s. blinder, 
Steven M.H. Wallman and Philip N. Diehl. In Hearing Before the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate. Washington DC: US 
Government Printing Office. 
Bruno, M. (1993). Crisis, Stabilization, and Economic Reform: Therapy by Consensus: 
Therapy by Consensus. Oxford University Press. 
Bruno, M., Di Tella, G., Dornbusch, R., and Fischer, S. (eds.) (1988). Inflation 
Stabilization: The Experience of Israel, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Mexico. MIT Press. 
Bruno, M. and Fischer, S. (1986). The inflationary process: Shocks and 
accommodation. In The Israeli Economy: Maturing through Crises, Y. Ben-Porath 
(ed.). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Bruno, M. and Piterman, S. (1988). The inflationary process: Shocks and 
accommodation. In Inflation Stabilization: The Experience of Israel, Argentina, Brazil, 
Bolivia, and Mexico, M. Bruno, G. Di Tella, R. Dornbusch and S. Fischer (eds.). MIT 
Press. 
33 
 
Clarida, R., Gali, J. and Gertler, M. (1999). "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New 
Keynesian Perspective" Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XXXVII, pp. 1661–1707. 
Clarida, R., Gali, J. and Gertler, M. (2000). "Monetary Rules and Macroeconomic 
Stability: Evidence and some Theory" The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (1): 
pp. 147-180. 
Drazen, A. and Helpman, E. (1990). Inflationary consequences of anticipated 
macroeconomic policies. The Review of Economic Studies, 57 (1): pp. 147–164. 
Friedman, M. (1968). "The role of monetary policy". American Economic 
Review, 68 (1): pp. 1–17. 
Friedman, M. (1991). Personal letter to the Governor of the Bank of Israel.  
Galí, J. and Gertler, M. (1999). “Inflation dynamics: A structural econometric 
analysis”. Journal of Monetary Economics, 44 (2): pp. 195-222. 
Galí, J., Gertler, M. and López-Salido, D. (2005) Robustness of the estimates of the 
hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve, Journal of Monetary Economics, 52 (6): pp. 1107-
1118. 
Gordon, R. J. (2011). “The History of the Phillips Curve: Consensus and Bifurcation”. 
Economica 78 (309): pp. 10-50. 
Gordon, J. (2013). “The Phillips Curve is alive and Well: Inflation and the NAIRU 
During the Slow Recovery”, working paper 19390 NBER, Cambridge, MA. 
Lindé, J. (2005). “Estimating New-Keynesian Phillips curves: A full information 
maximum likelihood approach”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 52 (6): pp. 1135-1149. 
Liviatan, N. and Melnick, R. (1999). Inflation and disinflation by steps in Israel. In 
Inflation and Disinflation in Israel, L. Leiderman (ed.). Research Department, Bank of 
Israel. 
Liviatan, N. and Piterman, S. (1986). Accelerating inflation and balance of payments 
crises: Israel 1973-1984. In The Israeli Economy: Maturing through Crises, Y. Ben- 
Porath (ed.). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Mavroeidis, M., Plagborg-Møller, M. and Stock, J. (2014). “Empirical Evidence on 
Inflation Expectations in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve”, Journal of Economic 
Literature Vol 52 (1): pp. 124-188. 
Melnick, R. (2016). “Measuring Unobserved Expected Inflation”, International 
Finance 19 (1): pp. 2-22. 
Orphanides, A. and Wilcox, D. W. (2002). The opportunistic approach to 
disinflation. International Finance, 5 (1): pp. 47–71. 
34 
 
Perron, P. (2006). Dealing with structural breaks. In Palgrave Handbook of 
Econometrics, Vol. 1: Econometric Theory, T. C. Mills and K. Patterson (eds.) Palgrave 
Macmillan. Pp. 278–352. 
Pflueger, C. E., and L. M. Viceira, (2011), “Return Predictability in the Treasury 
Market: Real Rates, Inflation, and Liquidity”, Working Paper 16892 NBER, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Phelps, E. S. (1967). “Phillips Curves, Expectations of Inflation and Optimal 
Employment over Time.” Economica, 34, no. 135: pp. 254–281. 
Rudd, J. and Whelan, K. (2005). “New tests of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve”. 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 52 (6): pp. 1167-1181. 
Samuelson, P. A., and R. M. Solow. 1960. “Analytical Aspects of Anti-inflation 
Policy. American Economic Review 50 (2): pp. 177–94. 
Sargent J. T. (1982). The End of Four Big Inflations. In Inflation: Causes and Effects 
Hall, R. E. (ed.). University of Chicago Press. 
Shiffer, Z. (2001). The rise and (very partial) decline of indexation in Israel. In 
Inflation and Disinflation in Israel, L. Leiderman (ed.). Research Department, Bank of 
Israel. 
Sokoler, M. (2000). Inflation targeting and exchange rate regime: The case of Israel. 
Practical Experiences on Inflation Targeting. International Conference, Bangkok, Bank 
of Thailand. 
Stock, J. H. (2011). “Discussion of Ball-Mazumder”, Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity (Spring): pp. 387-402. 
Woodford, M. (2003). Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. 
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Yariv, D. (1989) “Estimating inflation expectations in Israel and analyzing their 
development in light disinflation programs”. Bank of Israel Survey n. 64, Jerusalem 
(Hebrew). 
 
 
 
 
 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper Series 2016 
 
For a complete list of Discussion Papers published by the SFB 649, 
please visit http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de. 
 
 
 
001 "Downside risk and stock returns: An empirical analysis of the long-run 
and short-run dynamics from the G-7 Countries" by Cathy Yi-Hsuan 
Chen, Thomas C. Chiang and Wolfgang Karl Härdle, January 2016. 
002 "Uncertainty and Employment Dynamics in the Euro Area and the US" by 
Aleksei Netsunajev and  Katharina Glass, January 2016. 
003 "College Admissions with Entrance Exams: Centralized versus 
Decentralized" by Isa E. Hafalir, Rustamdjan Hakimov, Dorothea Kübler 
and Morimitsu Kurino, January 2016. 
004 "Leveraged ETF options implied volatility paradox: a statistical study" by 
Wolfgang Karl Härdle, Sergey Nasekin and Zhiwu Hong, February 2016. 
005 "The German Labor Market Miracle, 2003 -2015: An Assessment" by 
Michael C. Burda, February 2016. 
006 "What Derives the Bond Portfolio Value-at-Risk: Information Roles of 
Macroeconomic and Financial Stress Factors" by Anthony H. Tu and 
Cathy Yi-Hsuan Chen, February 2016. 
007 "Budget-neutral fiscal rules targeting inflation differentials" by Maren 
Brede, February 2016. 
008 "Measuring the benefit from reducing income inequality in terms of GDP" 
by Simon Voigts, February 2016. 
009 "Solving DSGE Portfolio Choice Models with Asymmetric Countries" by 
Grzegorz R. Dlugoszek, February 2016. 
010 "No Role for the Hartz Reforms? Demand and Supply Factors in the 
German Labor Market, 1993-2014" by Michael C. Burda and Stefanie 
Seele, February 2016. 
011 "Cognitive Load Increases Risk Aversion" by Holger Gerhardt, Guido P. 
Biele, Hauke R. Heekeren, and Harald Uhlig, March 2016. 
012 "Neighborhood Effects in Wind Farm Performance: An Econometric 
Approach" by Matthias Ritter, Simone Pieralli and Martin Odening, March 
2016. 
013 "The importance of time-varying parameters in new Keynesian models 
with zero lower bound" by Julien Albertini and Hong Lan, March 2016. 
014 "Aggregate Employment, Job Polarization and Inequalities: A 
Transatlantic Perspective" by Julien Albertini and Jean Olivier Hairault, 
March 2016. 
015 "The Anchoring of Inflation Expectations in the Short and in the Long 
Run" by Dieter Nautz, Aleksei Netsunajev and Till Strohsal, March 2016. 
016 "Irrational Exuberance and Herding in Financial Markets" by Christopher 
Boortz, March 2016. 
017 "Calculating Joint Confidence Bands for Impulse Response Functions 
using Highest Density Regions" by Helmut Lütkepohl, Anna Staszewska-
Bystrova and Peter Winker, March 2016. 
018 "Factorisable Sparse Tail Event Curves with Expectiles" by Wolfgang K. 
Härdle, Chen Huang and Shih-Kang Chao, March 2016. 
019 "International dynamics of inflation expectations" by Aleksei Netšunajev 
and Lars Winkelmann, May 2016. 
020 "Academic Ranking Scales in Economics: Prediction and Imdputation" by 
Alona Zharova, Andrija Mihoci and Wolfgang Karl Härdle, May 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin 
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". 
 
SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D- 0178 Berlin 
http://sfb649. iwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This r search was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschun sgemeinschaft throug  the SFB 649 "Ec nomic Risk". 
 
 
 
 
 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper Series 2016 
 
For a complete list of Discussion Papers published by the SFB 649, 
please visit http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de. 
 
 
 
021 "CRIX or evaluating blockchain based currencies" by Simon Trimborn 
and Wolfgang Karl Härdle, May 2016. 
022 "Towards a national indicator for urban green space provision and 
environmental inequalities in Germany: Method and findings" by Henry 
Wüstemann, Dennis Kalisch, June 2016. 
023 "A Mortality Model for Multi-populations: A Semi-Parametric Approach" 
by Lei Fang, Wolfgang K. Härdle and Juhyun Park, June 2016. 
024 "Simultaneous Inference for the Partially Linear Model with a Multivariate 
Unknown Function when the Covariates are Measured with Errors" by 
Kun Ho Kim, Shih-Kang Chao and Wolfgang K. Härdle, August 2016. 
025 "Forecasting Limit Order Book Liquidity Supply-Demand Curves with 
Functional AutoRegressive Dynamics" by Ying Chen, Wee Song Chua and 
Wolfgang K. Härdle, August 2016. 
026 "VAT multipliers and pass-through dynamics" by Simon Voigts, August 
2016. 
027 "Can a Bonus Overcome Moral Hazard? An Experiment on Voluntary 
Payments, Competition, and Reputation in Markets for Expert Services" 
by Vera Angelova and Tobias Regner, August 2016. 
028 "Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence" by Vera 
Angelova, Giuseppe Attanasi, Yolande Hiriart, August 2016. 
029 "What renders financial advisors less treacherous? On commissions and 
reciprocity" by Vera Angelova, August 2016. 
030 "Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of 
financial advice? An experimental sender-receiver game" by Vera 
Angelova and Tobias Regner, August 2016. 
031 "A first econometric analysis of the CRIX family" by Shi Chen, Cathy Yi-
Hsuan Chen, Wolfgang Karl Härdle, TM Lee and Bobby Ong, August 
2016. 
032 "Specification Testing in Nonparametric Instrumental Quantile 
Regression" by Christoph Breunig, August 2016. 
033 "Functional Principal Component Analysis for Derivatives of Multivariate 
Curves" by Maria Grith, Wolfgang K. Härdle, Alois Kneip and Heiko 
Wagner, August 2016. 
034 "Blooming Landscapes in the West? - German reunification and the price 
of land." by Raphael Schoettler and Nikolaus Wolf, September 2016. 
035 "Time-Adaptive Probabilistic Forecasts of Electricity Spot Prices with 
Application to Risk Management." by Brenda López Cabrera , Franziska 
Schulz, September 2016. 
036 "Protecting Unsophisticated Applicants in School Choice through 
Information Disclosure" by Christian Basteck and Marco Mantovani, 
September 2016. 
037 "Cognitive Ability and Games of School Choice" by Christian Basteck and 
Marco Mantovani, Oktober 2016. 
038 "The Cross-Section of Crypto-Currencies as Financial Assets: An 
Overview" by Hermann Elendner, Simon Trimborn, Bobby Ong and Teik 
Ming Lee, Oktober 2016. 
039 "Disinflation and the Phillips Curve: Israel 1986-2015" by Rafi Melnick 
and Till Strohsal, Oktober 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin 
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". 
 
SFB 649, Spandauer Straße 1, D- 0178 Berlin 
http://sfb649. iwi.hu-berlin.de 
 
This r search was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschun sgemeinschaft throug  the SFB 649 "Ec nomic Risk". 
 
